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For many years women tended to vote more conserva-
tive than men (the ‘old’ gender vote gap), but since the 
1980s this gap in many countries has shifted direction: 
now women in many countries are more likely to sup-
port left parties than men of the same age, in the same 
income bracket, and at the same educational level (the 
‘new’ gender vote gap). The literature largely agrees on 
a set of political-economic factors explaining the change 
in women’s political orientation: changed employment 
patterns, women’s higher educational achievements, and 
higher divorce rates. These trends turned women into 
supporters of generous social programs that promise 
to ‘de-familialize’ services formerly provided privately 
within the family. In this paper, we demonstrate that these 
conventional political-economic factors fall short in ex-
plaining the old gender vote gap. We may therefore also 
harbor doubts whether they provide us with a full story 
for the new gender vote gap. Instead, we highlight the im-
portance of religion for the gendered pattern of voting be-
havior that we observe. We argue that where vote choice 
expressed preferences on a non-economic, i.e. mainly re-
ligious issue dimension, parties in the past could afford – 
at least to some extent – ignoring voters’ socio-economic 
interests. Given that surveys show us a constantly higher 
degree of religiosity among women and a relatively per-
sistent and strong impact of religion on vote choice, reli-
gion can indeed, we argue, explain a substantial part of 
the old and new gender vote gap.
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7For many years women tended to vote 
more conservative than men (the “old” 
gender vote gap), but since the 1980s this 
has changed: women in many countries 
are now more likely to support left parties 
than men of the same age, same income 
bracket, and same educational level (the 
“new” gender vote gap; cf. Ingelhart and 
Norris 2000; Giger 2009). The literature 
has offered several explanations for this 
robust finding, but largely agrees on a set 
of determinants to explain the change in 
women’s political orientation: changed 
employment patterns, women’s higher 
educational achievements, higher divorce 
rates and consequently more lone moth-
ers. These trends turned women into sup-
porters of generous social programs that 
promise to “de-familialize” services for-
merly provided privately within the fam-
ily, i.e. overwhelmingly by women (Esp-
ing-Andersen 2009). De-familialization 
of family care makes it easier for women 
to find employment in the private service 
sector or in the welfare state itself, if the 
welfare state offers women enhanced em-
ployment chances in public social services 
(Huber and Stephens 2000). This expla-
nation generates both a temporal predic-
tion: over time, the new gender vote gap 
should widen, and a comparative predic-
tion: the new gender vote gap should vary 
with female labor force participation and 
divorce rates (cf. Iversen and Rosenbluth 
2006, 2010). This could account for the 
fact that in some countries (Scandinavia, 
North America) women developed pro-
welfare state preferences, i.e. voted left, 
much earlier than in other countries (e.g. 
Southern Europe).
Although the empirical evidence by 
and large matches these expectations, 
we think that this account leaves a couple 
of important questions unresolved, most 
importantly: Why did women’s and men’s 
voting behavior in the 1950s and 1960s 
differ (the old gender gap)? Female la-
bor force participation and divorce rates 
were still low, political preferences should 
have predominantly been formed at the 
household level and therefore supposedly 
should have been fully harmonious be-
tween the sexes. Since the conventional 
political-economic factors apparently fall 
short in explaining the old differences in 
political preferences among the sexes, we 
also doubt whether they fully explain the 
new. In this paper we highlight the impor-
tance of religion for the gendered pattern 
of voting behavior that we observe. We 
argue that where vote choice expressed 
preferences on a non-economic, i.e. main-
ly religious issue-dimension (De La O and 
Rodden 2008), parties in the past could 
afford – at least to some extent – ignoring 
voters’ socio-economic interests. Given 
that surveys show us a constantly higher 
degree of religiosity among women and 
a relatively persistent and strong impact 
of religion on vote choice (Dalton 1996; 
Brooks et al. 2006), religion can indeed, 
we argue, explain a substantial part of the 
old and new gender vote gap. 
Importantly, our argument pertains 
Introduction
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not only to religious determinants of the 
individual vote choice, but also to the 
competitive constellation among parties. 
We contend that in countries with a strong 
confessional cleavage, party competition 
over the religious, i.e. over-proportion-
ately female vote was distorted. Given 
that devout Catholics could not credibly 
threaten to switch to a left party given 
those parties’ pronounced, often aggres-
sive anti-clericalism, Christian democratic 
parties could for a long time count on loyal 
voters with a socio-economic background 
who otherwise, in the absence of the con-
fessional cleavage, would have opted for a 
different party with a more redistributive 
platform. Elsewhere, the inter-party com-
petition for the female vote was not reli-
giously contorted, and therefore left and 
right parties’ programmatic adjustment to 
the changed employment and family pat-
terns happened much earlier. 
In the following we show that (1) relig-
iosity remains a strong and independent 
factor in vote choice in Western democra-
cies (although the share of religious voters 
has decreased over time), that (2) gender 
differences in religiosity accounted for 
much of the old gender differences in vot-
ing behavior, i.e. that gender differences 
in voting substantially decrease once we 
control for religiosity. We demonstrate 
that religious voting is more pronounced 
in party systems with a strong pro-/anti-
clerical cleavage (3). And we show that 
(4) the gender vote gap is almost fully 
explained with controls for employment, 
marital status, and religiosity.
We also point to one intervening fac-
tor which up to now has been rather ne-
glected in the literature: although women 
may develop an interest in more generous 
child care provision, all-day schooling, 
and other welfare programs that “de-fa-
milialize” services initially provided pri-
vately, these political preferences often, 
but not necessarily, translate into a vote 
for a left party. This is because women’s 
interests in easy labor market entry may 
also translate into preferences for less 
employment protection, lower minimum 
wages, and higher labor market flexibility 
– given that high minimum wages crowd 
out private services (like private child 
care) and given that high employment 
protection discriminates against women 
with their higher probability of career in-
terruption (Estevez-Abe 2006). But these 
“outsider” interests in less regulation 
have clearly not been served by tradition-
al left parties (Rueda 2005). We therefore 
need to control for labor market context 
if we want to identify the determinants of 
the female vote choice: where the provi-
sion of public social services by a gener-
ous welfare state is a likely option, women 
might increasingly vote for social demo-
cratic parties (Huber and Stephens 2000; 
Iversen and Wren 1998), but where this is 
not a realistic option, it might be in their 
interest to vote for a party that promises 
to deregulate labor markets.
Our argument contributes to the lit-
erature in several respects: we offer a 
consistent explanation for the alignment 
and re-alignment of the female vote. In 
accordance with a larger voting literature 
(cf. Dalton 1996; Brooks et al. 2006), we 
stress the enduring importance of non-
economic factors, in particular the impact 
of religion on vote choices. We emphasize 
that this also means that women’s political 
9preferences in conservative welfare states 
or Catholic countries cannot exclusively 
be explained with rational calculations 
based on socio-economic interests (Ivers-
en and Rosenbluth 2006, 2010). Thereby 
our argument also helps explain a para-
dox of the comparative welfare state liter-
ature, namely that women in Continental 
and Southern Europe tended to vote for 
parties that were particularly unrespon-
sive to their socio-economic interests 
(Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1994; Sainsbury 
1996; O'Connor et al. 1999). Our main ex-
planation points to the distorted electoral 
competition for the religious vote in coun-
tries with a strong confessional cleavage. 
Moreover, we demonstrate the context 
sensitivity of women’s vote choice. Where 
the generous provision of social services 
by the welfare state was not a feasible op-
tion (Iversen and Wren 1998), women’s 
interest in less regulated labor markets of-
ten made them opt for the political right. 
We thereby demonstrate the relevance of 
the service economy trilemma for the new 
gender vote gap in Western European 
countries since the 1970s.
The paper proceeds as follows: After 
a brief summary of the literature, we de-
velop our own hypotheses, describe our 
data and report our empirical findings and 
finally conclude.
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Explaining the Gender Vote Gap: the Literature
The literature on electoral behavior in the 
first three postwar decades finds a per-
sistent pattern of “female conservatism” 
– women are more likely than men with 
the same socio-economic characteristics 
to vote for conservative parties (Norris 
1987). These gender differences in voting 
behavior were often not very large and 
varied across countries, but they existed 
and persisted. However, this old gender 
vote gap seemed to have dissolved by the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. With the Unit-
ed States as a forerunner and the Scandi-
navian countries close behind, students of 
electoral behavior observed first women’s 
political de-alignment and subsequently 
their re-alignment: not only did the old 
gender vote gap disappear in many coun-
tries, a new one appeared in its stead, 
with women now being more likely to vote 
left than men of the same age, income and 
educational level (Studlar et al. 1998; In-
glehart and Norris 2000: 450, Figure 3). 
The literature has explained the tradi-
tional gender differences in political pref-
erences and behavior with women’s lower 
degree of labor market participation and 
longer life expectancy. The literature also 
refers to women’s educational role in the 
family and the corresponding stronger 
emphasis on moral and value issues as 
the cause of political preferences and of a 
voting behavior that seems to be less well 
predicted with socio-economic status (cf. 
Jelen et al. 1994). The new gender vote 
gap then could – to a large extent, so it 
seemed – be consistently explained with 
changes in the determinants of the old 
one: with higher female labor force par-
ticipation, higher divorce rates, and more 
generally with changed family patterns 
and encompassing value change. With a 
higher chance of being or becoming eco-
nomically independent of the male part-
ner’s income and his labor market fate, 
with a higher chance of own labor force 
participation, with higher educational 
attainment, women’s voting decisions 
should more and more mirror their dis-
tinct economic policy preferences. Wom-
en’s changed economic role went hand 
in hand with a broader value change, a 
stronger emphasis on self-expression, 
equal opportunity, the erosion of tradi-
tional gender roles, more liberal views on 
the family and sexual mores. According to 
the “developmental” theory of the old and 
new gender vote gap structural and cul-
tural changes – mutually reinforcing each 
other – both contributed to women’s po-
litical de- and re-alignment (Inglehart and 
Norris 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; 
Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997).
Behind these explanations lies an ar-
gument in which a lesser degree of labor 
market participation or generally of eco-
nomic involvement allows non-economic 
considerations to more forcefully enter 
the individual voting decision. Jelen et 
al. (1994: 171) summarize this position 
as follows: “relatively sheltered lives led 
by most women in much of the West in 
earlier decades … rendered women rela-
tively pure carriers of a culture’s tradi-
11
tions. (…) as women increasingly enter 
the paid labour force, these traditional 
differences are likely to be reduced or 
eliminated.” More recent studies on the 
impact of religion on political preferences 
are compatible with this argument (cf. De 
la O and Rodden 2008; Finseraas 2010). 
A second, “moral” issue dimension ex-
plains deviations from purely economic, 
interest-driven voting because it forces 
voters to choose between their moral and 
economic preferences. Race or religion in 
the context of US politics or religion in the 
context of European politics can be such 
a second dimension, which splits the class 
vote and thereby weakens the support of 
the left. The saliency of the two dimen-
sions may differ among societal groups. 
For instance, De la O and Rodden (2008: 
440) show that the relationship between 
church attendance and voting for non-left 
parties is mainly driven by low income 
voters. In contrast, high income voters 
seem to more closely follow their econom-
ic preferences. In a variation of this argu-
ment, Roemer (1997, 2001) explains de-
viations from economic voting with “issue 
bundling”. Political parties adopt posi-
tions on several issue dimensions. Voters 
then choose among these issue bundles 
offered. Given a limited number of par-
ties, poor religious voters might be forced 
to choose between a pro-redistribution, 
anti-clerical and an anti-redistribution, 
pro-clerical party. For strongly religious 
voters, the anti-clerical party might not be 
an option.
Other explanations for the observed 
gender differences have been put for-
ward. Some hold that spirituality and pro-
tection against existential threats are sub-
stitutes for each other, so that religious 
persons demand less social protection 
than non-religious people, also because 
they in situations of need can count on 
local support networks (Gill 2001; Norris 
and Inglehart 2004; Scheve and Stasav-
age 2006). An alternative argument holds 
that traditionally the gender division of 
labor had aligned women’s political pref-
erences with that of their male partners 
(cf. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, 2006).1 
Given that women have natural advantag-
es in caring for very young children, fami-
lies in the past tended towards an “effi-
cient” division of labor: men are in formal 
employment, women do the non-market 
family work (Becker 1981). But once di-
vorce and/or female labor force participa-
tion become likely events, women start 
to care more about their labor market 
“outside options”. Male and female eco-
nomic and then also political preferences 
become distinct. 
Women’s new interests primarily con-
cern the compatibility of work and fam-
ily, easier labor market access, a (public) 
infrastructure for early child care and 
all-day schooling as well as for caring 
for the old and frail, own welfare entitle-
1 One – less often discussed – implication 
would be that we may then observe not only 
gender differences in vote choices, but also in 
turnout. In fact, studies on electoral turnout 
have found persistent, if small differences 
between the sexes (Blais 2000; Franklin 2004), 
but usually do not discuss causes and conse-
quences. Our argument stresses that religious 
voters are confronted with ‘cross-pressures’ – 
on a socioeconomic dimension they would like 
to vote for left parties, on a second dimension 
they cannot, since left parties are aggressively 
anti-clerical. Cross-pressure has been identi-
fied as a major determinant of abstention.
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ments instead of those that are linked to 
the male’s employment status, the reform 
of tax provisions that discriminate against 
female labor force participation etc. (Esp-
ing-Andersen 2009). The traditional gen-
der division of labor – epitomized in the 
“male breadwinner” model – becomes 
contested, since women’s household 
skills are only partially marketable and are 
developed at the cost of their marketable 
skills. With higher divorce rates, women 
therefore develop political preferences 
for welfare state policies that would ease 
their labor force participation (Manza and 
Brooks 1998).2  Rosenbluth and Iversen 
(2010) see variations in values then as 
caused by the different degrees of wom-
en’s inclusion into the labor market: “In 
countries where the demand for female 
labor is limited … women are more likely 
than men to be socially conservative de-
spite the unflattering roles their conserva-
tism gives them to play. … the reason is 
that women for whom the marriage mar-
ket is the principal way to secure a live-
lihood seek to shore up the sanctity and 
strength of family values. Once committed 
to the life of a married woman, that mar-
riage is the best that binds securely and 
for which obligations are taken seriously 
by the man as well as by the woman” 
(Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010: 113).
These explanations leave us with a 
2 This is not necessarily the case, but rather 
dependent on whether the transition to a post-
industrial society with high female employ-
ment in the service sector takes a ‘private’ or 
a ‘public’ route, i.e. whether much of the new 
social services are provided by the welfare state 
– as in Scandinavia – or through the market – 
as in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Scharpf 1997; 
Iversen and Wren 1998).
couple of open questions. Let us first 
take the “religious people demand less 
welfare”-argument. The reversed causali-
ty seems more plausible: where traditional 
religious voting loses its former strength, 
religious parties (= Christian Democracy) 
may want to keep their voters by appeal-
ing increasingly to their material inter-
ests. Social protection may be a substitute 
for religiosity, not because religious per-
sons demand less social protection, but 
because religious parties supply more so-
cial protection once religious motives lose 
strength (Kersbergen and Manow 2009). 
This implies – put pointedly – that the wel-
fare state does not cause secularization 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004), but is caused 
by secularization, i.e. a waning religiosity. 
As we know, Christian Democratic par-
ties are not simply the transmission belt 
for the Catholic Church and its social doc-
trine, but they have used social policies 
to become independent from the church 
hierarchy (cf. Kalyvas 1996) and – we can 
add – more recently to become independ-
ent from exclusively religiously motivated 
voters, particularly in light of the fact that 
these voters are declining in numbers. 
This would also explain the “women un-
friendliness” of the Christian Democratic 
welfare state: these parties could afford 
to neglect the interests of the groups who 
were most loyally attached to them.
Secondly, let us look at Iversen/Rosen-
bluth’s argument about women’s rational 
preferences for the male breadwinner 
model. Changing family patterns and 
work roles are common trends affecting 
all Western nations, but why has the de-
mand for female labor been more limited 
in some countries and why was the tran-
13
sition towards a post-industrial and more 
gender-equal society slower in some 
countries than in others in the first place?3 
We encounter the same problem when we 
consider divorce rates as an explanatory 
factor for recent changes in female voting 
behavior. Edlund and Pande (2002) found 
a nexus between a country’s “divorce 
risk” and women’s left voting – but again 
it is not clear whether higher divorce rates 
indicate a weakening of religious norms 
– a weakening which then would also set 
free a vote that previously had been “cap-
tured” by religious parties (i.e. Christian 
Democracy), or whether women – con-
fronted with higher divorce rates – react 
rationally to the risk of income loss due 
to a family breakup by voting for left par-
ties and their pro-welfare state programs. 
For labor force participation as well as for 
divorce rates, the rationalist/materialist 
account has a hard time explaining why 
in the past some countries female labor 
force participation was so much lower 
than elsewhere, if the old “male bread-
winner” model was simply based on the 
small (and universal) differences between 
the sexes with respect to caring for very 
young children, or why the breakup of a 
marriage was less likely in some countries 
than in others. In this context it seems im-
portant to emphasize that a gender gap 
does not only emerge “when marriage 
contracting is incomplete and termination 
3 Part of the answer may lie in the gendered 
employment pattern of coordinated econo-
mies (Estevez-Abe 2006). But only part, since 
countries like Italy that do not rank high on any 
index of non-market coordination show the pat-
tern of low female labor force participation, low 
divorce rates, a traditional male breadwinner 
model, and a conservative gender vote gap.
of the contract is an ever-present possibil-
ity” (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010: 110), 
since – as we have seen – voting behavior 
also differed between the sexes in the old 
days of low divorce rates. This, we claim, 
points to the persisting independent caus-
al impact of religion or religiosity on vote 
choices.
Once this independent causal impact 
is acknowledged, we can move beyond 
the ultimately unanswerable question 
whether Catholicism led to a very tra-
ditional, patriarchic gender division of 
labor which then contributed to female 
conservatism, or whether a low degree of 
women’s integration into the labor mar-
ket instilled conservative values among 
female voters. Our argument, which em-
phasizes the influence of the party sys-
tem, posits that in countries with a strong 
pro-/anti-clericalism cleavage pious vot-
ers could not vote for left parties because 
of the latter’s strong anti-clerical stance. 
One central prediction following from this 
is that the influence of religion on politi-
cal preference formation and voting will 
not go away once we control for female 
labor force participation or for differences 
in marital status. Our empirical investiga-
tion will show that religiosity remains a 
strong if slowly weakening determinant 
of vote choices and political preferences 
even if we control for all relevant econom-
ic and familial factors. The higher degree 
of religiosity among women is a factor 
that consistently explains cross-country 
and temporal variance in the old and new 
gender vote gaps, with its consequences 
for redistribution, design of welfare state 
schemes, gender division of labor etc. Our 
main causal path, therefore, does not go 
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through the labor market, but through the 
party system.4 Our argument generates a 
series of hypotheses that will be tested in 
the following section:
(H1) Religiosity is a powerful inde-
pendent predictor of the voting decision, 
in particular in countries characterized by 
a strong confessional cleavage.
(H2) The weaker the confessional 
cleavage in a country, the earlier the old 
gender vote gap disappears. 
 (H3) The old (new) gender vote gap 
becomes weaker (stronger) when we con-
trol for religiosity. 
(H4) Non-married female respondents 
are more likely to vote for left and cent-
er-left parties. But since marital status is 
endogenous to religiosity, the effect of 
marital status is weaker than the effect of 
religiosity.
(H5) Labor market participation in-
creases the likelihood of women voting for 
left and center-left parties if the country 
4 This distinguishes our argument from 
John Roemer’s related argument (Roemer 
1997, 2001). His model supposes two-party 
competition in two dimensions and therefore 
seems to fit the US case better. It emphasizes 
the incentives for a left party: Given that some 
religious poor voters do not vote for the left, a 
left party has to cater to a voter with a higher 
income than it would in the absence of this 
second dimension. We look at multi-party 
systems in which inter-party competition over 
a certain group of voters is severely distorted. 
We emphasize the incentives for the (center-)
right party: Given that it can count on a group 
of loyal voters, it can neglect this group’s mate-
rial interests. Our model is rather informed 
by Europe’s Christian Democratic party family 
and the welfare states it has contributed to set 
up in the postwar period. We would also like to 
highlight that a second moral issue dimension 
cannot be invoked by politicians at will – but 
either exists in a country or does not exist.
is characterized by the public provision 
of social services. Again, since labor mar-
ket participation is (partly) endogenous 
to religiosity, the effect of labor market 
participation is weaker than the effect of 
religiosity.
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Data and some descriptive findings
We use two data sources, the World Val-
ue Survey and the Eurobarometer Sur-
veys. Eurobarometer is a biannual survey 
conducted in all EU member states with 
around 1,000 respondents per country. 
The 86 surveys from 1970 to 2002 have 
been integrated and standardized in the 
EB trendfile as provided by the Mannhe-
im Centre for European Social Research 
with around 1.13 million observations. We 
have combined the trendfile with more 
recent Eurobarometer surveys to cover 
four full decades of socio-economic and 
cultural change from 1970 to 2010. The 
Eurobarometer surveys are a surprisingly 
underused data source. Besides a bat-
tery of EU-related questions, the surveys 
include a large number of standard ques-
tions relating to the respondent’s demo-
graphic, socio-economic and attitudinal 
profile. Surveys ask respondents for their 
left-right self-placement, their vote inten-
tion, and whether they “feel close” to a 
particular party or are party members. 
This information can be combined with 
the additional basic demographic and 
socio-economic information on gender, 
income, age, education, marital status, 
and occupation. The Eurobarometer sur-
veys also provide information on denomi-
nation, religiosity, work for charitable or 
religious organizations, and – of particu-
lar importance for our context – on church 
attendance. This exceptionally rich data 
set allows for a longitudinal study of the 
changing political and religious affilia-
tions of men and women, although such 
an endeavor is hindered by the fact that 
some basic categories have not been re-
ported continuously.5
The World Value Survey is the larg-
est cross-national survey on political atti-
tudes. As of now, five waves are available. 
In the following analyses, we use waves 1 
(early 1980s), 2 (early 1990s) and 4 (early 
2000s) from the four-wave integrated data 
file produced by the WVS data archive. 
There are thus approximately ten years 
between each wave. The following ten 
countries are included in all three waves: 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
and the United States of America. The 
World Value Survey provides information 
on the party respondents would vote for, 
church attendance, labor market partici-
pation, marital status, and a range of con-
trol variables. 
We start with some descriptive find-
ings based on the long-term trends docu-
mented by four decades of Eurobarometer 
surveys. For presentational reasons, we 
first pick four prototypical countries: Italy 
as a classic Catholic country with a strong 
confessional cleavage line, with a con-
servative, “women-unfriendly” welfare 
5 The church attendance question has been 
asked only rarely in Eurobarometers conducted 
after 1998, the vote intention question has 
unfortunately not been continued past 2000, 
and the household income question has been 
dropped in post-2002 surveys (see below).
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state and – paradoxically – a particularly 
strong conservative gender vote gap (Cor-
betta and Cavazza 2008); Germany as an-
other conservative welfare state, although 
with somehow different labor market and 
social security institutions, but historical-
ly also with a strong conservative gender 
vote gap (Inglehart and Norris 2000: Ta-
ble 1, 443); Denmark as an initially Prot-
estant, today very secular society in which 
women early on shifted their allegiance 
to left parties in support of the generous 
Scandinavian welfare state policies; final-
ly Great Britain as a country with an inter-
mediate level of religiosity (and a domi-
nant Anglican state church, therefore no 
strong confessional cleavage line), with 
a liberal-residual welfare state, in which 
women did not find employment in pub-
lic (social) services, but mainly in private 
services (Scharpf 1997; Iversen and Wren 
1998), where women’s interests with re-
spect to the welfare state therefore were 
much more equivocal. Without employ-
ment in the public sector as a very likely 
option, female labor force participation 
rests on a flexible labor market both in 
the sense of allowing to substitute private 
family services via a cheap private service 
sector and of easing labor market entry by 
“outsiders” (Rueda 2005). 6
Figure 1 displays the strength of the 
confessional cleavage in these four coun-
tries. Using the data by Laver and Hunt 
(1992) and for parties with a vote share 
higher than 5 percent at the time of the 
expert survey (1989), Figure 1 shows the 
6 The EB surveys contain data for five more 
countries from the 1970s onwards. The analysis 
of Belgian, Dutch, and French data leads to 
identical conclusions (results are available 
upon request). We did not use data for Luxem-
bourg (low number of observations) and Ireland 
(the confessional cleavage is intermingled with 
issues of national identity and independence).
Figure 1: Anti-clerical (1) vs. pro-clerical (20) policy scale in 1989 
Note: Position of party leadership on the anti-clerical (1) vs. pro-clerical (20) policy scale based on an 
expert survey conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992). Only parties that had a vote share higher than five 
percent at the time of the expert survey (1989) are listed. Source of party vote share: Armingeon et al. 
(2010). 
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position of the party leadership on the 
anti-clerical (1) vs. pro-clerical (20) policy 
scale. The strongest confessional cleav-
age can be observed in Italy, followed by 
West Germany. Virtually no confessional 
cleavage can be observed in Great Britain. 
Finally, Denmark is located somewhere 
in-between with a quite pro-clerical Lib-
eral Party (14.25) and an only moder-
ately anti-clerical Social Democratic Party 
(8.67). 
We focus on church attendance as our 
indicator for religiosity. This is a better in-
dicator than religious beliefs “because it 
ties religiosity to existing institutions in-
stead of more abstract religious concepts 
and values” (Minkenberg 2002: 237). In 
addition, church attendance captures the 
element of social control that is central to 
our argument. Finally, this operationaliza-
tion enables us to use the same variable 
in both datasets and across all countries. 
We are aware that this indicator tends to 
bias against Protestant countries, since 
Protestantism is a more individualized 
religion and puts stronger emphasis on 
individual forms of religious practice, like 
prayers (Haller and Höllinger 1994). Our 
main reason for using church attendance 
is data availability and comparability. 
Church attendance is also better covered 
in the Eurobarometer surveys with 33 sur-
veys including this question in the trend-
file alone (i.e. from 1972-2002), but only 
21 surveys asking about the respondents’ 
religiosity. Most importantly in our con-
text, church attendance has figured in an 
additional five surveys in the 2000s (see 
appendix below, surveys in 2005, 2006 
and 2010), which allows us to study four 
full decades of changing religious behav-
ior and attitudes, while religiosity or the 
importance of religion has not been an 
explicit topic in these more recent sur-
veys. The same reasoning also guides our 
choice of dependent variables. We use the 
vote intention variable in our analysis of 
World Value Survey data. However, in the 
case of Eurobarometer surveys, data avail-
ability speaks in favor of using the left-
right self-placement of respondents (77 
surveys) as our dependent variable, rather 
than their vote intention (59 surveys) or 
their last vote (covered in 31 surveys). 
Very unfortunately, vote intention has dis-
appeared altogether from Eurobarometer 
surveys after 20027 , the last vote question 
has been asked only once, in 2008 (EB 
69.2), but not in a survey with informa-
tion on church attendance. However, we 
arrive at similar conclusions when using 
vote intention as our dependent variable 
in the analysis of Eurobarometer surveys 
(results are available upon request).
Figure 2 (p. 18) displays the share of 
frequent churchgoers (attending church 
services once a week or more) by gen-
der for Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and 
West Germany in the period 1970 to 2010. 
It shows that religiosity is clearly strong-
est in Catholic Italy, but even here we see 
very marked gender differences. Almost 
50 % of all Italian women go to church 
once or several times a week to about a 
third of all Italian men. This demonstrates 
that a substantial share of the old gender 
vote gap in the South European Catholic 
countries is due to the marked gender dif-
ferences in religiosity. In the more secu-
7 The last Eurobarometer survey containing 
data on vote intention, church attendance, and 
control variables is from 1994.
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Figure 2: Share of frequent churchgoers (several times or once a week), by country and year, 1970-
2010 
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer trendfile 1970-2002 (EB 1996 omitted). 2005: EB63.1, EB63.4, 
EB64.3; 2006: EB65.2; 2010: EB73.1. Data for 1972, 1974, 1979, 1982-84, 1986-87, 1996-97, 1999-2004, 
and 2007-2009 linearly imputed. 
larized countries Denmark, Great Britain, 
and West Germany gender differences 
are less marked, although we find con-
stantly higher church attendance rates 
among women in these countries, too. In 
addition, Figure 2 shows that the share 
of frequent churchgoers has declined in 
all countries except Denmark, where the 
share of frequent churchgoers was al-
ready below 5 percent in the early 1970s. 
In Italy the share of frequent churchgoers 
has declined from more than 50 percent 
in the early 1970s to less than 30 percent 
in 2010; in Great Britain and West Ger-
many the share of frequent churchgoers 
has declined from about 25 percent in the 
1970s to about 10 percent in mid-2000s.
In parallel to these decreasing levels 
of religiosity, we observe a change in the 
political positions of men and women. 
Figure 3 (p. 19) displays the gender vote 
gap for the four countries in the period 
1973 to 2010 using Eurobarometer data. 
For reasons of data availability, we use 
the respondents’ left/right self-placement, 
which is a highly significant predictor of 
respondents’ vote intention and party af-
filiation. The gender vote gap is measured 
as the difference between the share of 
women who score themselves as “left” (1 
to 3 out of 10) and the share of men who 
score themselves as “left”. Figure 3 shows 
a clear old gender vote gap in Italy up to 
the mid-1990s and a clear new gender 
vote gap in Denmark from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Gender differences are less pro-
nounced in Great Britain and West Ger-
many. However, a move from a rather old 
gender vote gap to a new gender vote gap 
is clearly discernible. 
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Thus, we can observe a parallel trend 
in Western democracies: while the gender 
vote gap has turned from “old” (women 
vote more conservative than men) to 
“new” (men vote more conservative than 
women), the share of highly religious 
voters has declined in parallel. Not only 
religiosity has changed in the last four 
decades, however. Figure 4 (p. 20) shows 
the average development of the share of 
respondents living alone (divorced, sepa-
rated, without partner) and the female de-
pendent employment rates in the period 
1975 to 2010. In all four countries, we are 
observing secular trends towards single 
households and marital instability (most 
clearly in Denmark and Great Britain) as 
well as female labor market participation 
(most clearly in Italy and West Germany). 
As in the case of religiosity, these secular 
trends run in parallel to the changes in 
the gender vote gap. 
Multivariate analysis
Given these parallel developments pre-
sented in the previous section, we now 
turn to a multivariate analysis of the gen-
der vote gap. In a first step, we analyze 
World Value Survey data to identify gen-
eral trends across Western democracies. 
The advantage of this data is that we can 
analyze more countries (10) and incor-
porate more control variables into our 
regression models. The drawback is that 
we only have data for the early 1980s, 
early 1990s and early 2000s. 8 In a second 
8 Using the other two available waves would 
force us to use different countries in the analy-
sis of the different periods.
Figure 3: Gender vote gap, by country and year, 1973-2010 
 
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer trendfile 1970-2002; 2003: EB59.1; 2004: EB61; 2005: EB63.4; 2006: 
EB65.1; 2007: EB67.2; 2008: EB69.2; 2009: EB71.1; 2010: EB73.4. Data for 1974 and 1975 are linearly 
imputed. 
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step, we use Eurobarometer data for the 
detailed analysis of the gender vote gap 
in Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and West 
Germany. Eurobarometer data have the 
advantage that we can cover a longer time 
period (1970 to 2010). However, we are 
more limited with regard to use of control 
variables. 
In the subsequent analysis of World 
Value Survey data, we use the intention 
to vote for left or center-left parties as our 
dependent variable. Respondents were 
asked which party they would vote for if 
national elections were held tomorrow.. 
We use a dummy variable to distinguish 
between respondents with the intention 
to vote for left or center-left parties and 
respondents with the intention to vote for 
any other party. We classified parties us-
ing Cusack et al.’s (2006) party classifica-
tion scheme. Our four main independent 
variables are gender, religiosity, labor 
market participation, and marital status. 
We code respondents as religious if they 
attend religious services once a week or 
more. For labor market participation, we 
code respondents as economically ac-
tive if they are employed (full-time and 
part-time), self-employed or looking for 
work (unemployed). The operationaliza-
tion of gender is straightforward. Finally, 
marital status is measured using a dummy 
variable, which distinguishes between re-
spondents living alone (divorced, sepa-
rated, without partner) and the remaining 
respondents. In addition, we add interac-
tion effects between gender and religios-
ity, gender and labor market participation, 
and gender and marital status. We use the 
three interactions to test whether religios-
ity, labor market participation, and mari-
tal status have different effects on women 
than on men. Finally, we follow the lit-
erature in controlling for age, education, 
income, unemployment, and union mem-
bership (De La O and Rodden 2008). See 
Figure 4: Respondents living alone (divorced, separated, without partner) and female dependent 
employment, 1975-2010 
 
Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer trendfile 1970-2002; 2003: EB59.1; 2004: EB61; 2005: EB63.4; 2006: 
EB65.1; 2007: EB67.2; 2008: EB69.2; 2009: EB71.1; 2010: EB73.4.  
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Table 1b: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of dependent employment on left vote 
 Women Men 
Early 1980s 0.056 [0.009; 0.104] 
-0.020 
[-0.070; 0.034] 
Early 1990s 0.002 [-0.028; 0.032] 
0.019 
[-0.013; 0.050] 
Early 2000s 0.028 [-0.004; 0.061] 
-0.005 
[-0.038; 0.027] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets). 
Table 1a: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of church attendance on left vote 
 Women Men 
Early 1980s -0.059 [-0.102; -0.015] 
-0.115 
[-0.162; -0.067] 
Early 1990s -0.222 [-0.250; -0.194] 
-0.207 
[-0.237; -0.177] 
Early 2000s -0.175 [-0.204; -0.145] 
-0.143 
[-0.177; -0.109] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).  
 
Table 1c: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of marital status (divorced, separated, 
single) on left vote 
 Women Men 
Early 1980s 0.058 [0.007; 0.108] 
0.024 
[-0.027; 0.075] 
Early 1990s -0.000 [-0.034; 0.033] 
0.009 
[-0.023; 0.041] 
Early 2000s 0.043 [0.011; 0.076] 
0.033 
[0.007; 0.065] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).  
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Table 1d: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of gender on left vote 
 Early 1980s Early 1990s Early 2000s 
Not employed, not living 
alone, not religious, 
-0.064 
[-0.119; -0.009] 
0.044 
[0.011; 0.077] 
0.029 
[-0.005; 0.063] 
Not employed, not living 
alone, religious, 
-0.008 
[-0.066; 0.049] 
0.029 
[-0.007; 0.065] 
-0.002 
[-0.002; 0.036] 
Not employed, living 
alone, not religious 
-0.030 
[-0.100: 0.041] 
0.034 
[-0.012; 0.080] 
0.040 
[-0.004; 0.083] 
Not employed, living, 
alone, religious 
0.025 
[-0.051; 0.101] 
0.021 
[-0.025; 0.067] 
0.006 
[-0.042; 0.055] 
Employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
0.014 
[-0.040; 0.067] 
0.027 
[-0.002; 0.057] 
0.064 
[0.064; 0.099] 
Employed, not living 
alone, religious 
0.063 
[0.003; 0.124] 
0.015 
[-0.023; 0.054] 
0.025 
[-0.016; 0.067] 
Employed, living alone, 
not religious 
0.050 
[-0.014; 0.114] 
0.017 
[-0.024; 0.059] 
0.075 
[0.036; 0.114] 
Employed, living alone, 
religious 
0.100 
[0.026; 0.175] 
0.007 
[-0.040; 0.054] 
0.035 
[-0.014; 0.085] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).  
1d can be summarized as follows: First, 
religiosity has a strong negative effect on 
the probability to vote for left or center-
left parties (see Table 1a). This effect is 
significant for both men and woman, and 
for all three waves. No meaningful differ-
ences between the genders can be ob-
served.
Second, labor market participation 
only has a weak effect on left party vote 
(see Table 1b). Although the coefficient is 
consistently positive for female respond-
ents, only the coefficient for the first wave 
(early 1980s) is significantly different 
from zero. No effect of labor market par-
ticipation can be observed in the case of 
male respondents. 
Third, living alone (divorced, separat-
ed, without partner) has a positive effect 
on the probability of voting for left and 
center-left parties (see Table 1c), in par-
ticular for female respondents. The coeffi-
the appendix for a detailed discussion of 
the operationalization. 
We are primarily interested in the in-
teraction effects between gender on the 
one hand and religiosity, labor market 
participation, and marital status on the 
other hand. The interpretation of interac-
tion effects is fundamentally different for 
non-linear regression models such as log-
it models compared to linear regression 
models. For instance, an insignificant es-
timate of the interaction coefficient does 
not necessarily indicate an insignificant 
effect; nor does the sign of the coefficient 
necessarily denote the correct direction 
of the effect (Ai and Norton 2003). Conse-
quently, we predict probabilities based on 
our regression models for all three waves 
only varying the variables of interest (see 
Tables 1a to 1d). The regression models 
are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The findings presented in Tables 1a to 
23
cients are positive and significantly differ-
ent from zero in the early 1980s and the 
early 2000s for female respondents and in 
the early 2000s for male respondents. 
Fourth, substantively, religiosity is a 
more powerful predictor of vote choice 
than labor market participation and mari-
tal status. For instance, religiosity de-
creases the probability of left party choice 
by between 5.9 to 22.2 percentage points 
(see Table 1a). In contrast, labor market 
participation changes the probability of 
left party choice by maximum 5.6 per-
centage points (see Table 1b), while mari-
tal status changes the probability of left 
party choice by maximum 5.8 percentage 
points (see Table 1c).
Finally, when we control for religios-
ity, marital status, and labor market par-
ticipation, gender has only a weak effect 
on left party choice (see Table 1d). Out of 
eight possible combinations of our dum-
my variables (2^3) in the three waves of 
the World Value Survey, we find signifi-
cant effects of gender in only six cases 
(out of 24 possible cases). This clearly 
shows that religiosity, marital status and 
labor market participation can explain a 
considerable part of the observed gender 
vote gap. 
In sum, we find some evidence in 
favor of all three secular trends identi-
fied above. Respondents living alone are 
more likely to vote for left and center-left 
parties, while religious respondents are 
less likely to do so. With regard to la-
bor market participation, the evidence is 
more mixed. Overall, religiosity is clearly 
the most powerful predictor of left party 
choice and has a strong and independent 
effect on vote choice. 
In a second step, we now turn to the 
detailed analysis of our four “prototypi-
cal” cases. Above, we argued that we 
should be able to observe profound cross-
national differences because of marked 
differences in the strength of the confes-
sional cleavage (see Figure 1) and differ-
ent employment opportunities for female 
labor market participants. Using Euroba-
rometer surveys we now follow the de-
velopments in these four countries over 
four decades. We look at the left-right 
self-placement, a variable which in the 
Eurobarometer dataset runs from 1 to 10. 
We have recoded it into one variable cap-
turing whether respondents have placed 
themselves in the interval 1 to 3 (left) or 
not. We then look at the covariates for a 
left self-placement controlling for religi-
osity, labor market participation, marital 
status, age, income, and education. Data 
availability forces us to drop some Euro-
barometer surveys from our dataset. Most 
importantly, only one Eurobarometer sur-
vey in the first decade of the 21st century 
contains all variables needed to estimate 
these regression models. As a result, the 
last decade refers to EB 73.1 (2010) only. 
Figure 5 (p. 24) shows the effect of 
controlling for religiosity on the coeffi-
cient of the variable “gender”. It displays 
the coefficients with (dark gray) and with-
out (light gray) control for religiosity for 
four countries and four decades. In each 
country and in each decade, controlling 
for religiosity decreases (increases) the 
negative (positive) of gender on left party 
choice. Thus, in all four countries and in 
all four decades, religiosity contributes to 
the old gender vote gap (or inhibits the 
new gender vote gap from becoming vis-
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Figure 5: Effect of gender on left self-placement in four decades, with control for religiosity (dark gray 
bars) and without control for religiosity (light gray bars) 
West Germany     Italy 
 Denmark     Great Britain 
Note: Logistic regressions with the dependent variable left self-placement. The figures show the 
coefficient of the variable gender. The following control variables have been used: age, education, and 
income (socio-economic level in the model using data from 2010). Dark gray bars display the 
coefficient in models controlling for religiosity (measured with church attendance, ranging from 1 
(never) to 5 (several times a week)), light gray bars display the coefficient in models not controlling for 
religiosity. Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 (2010). 
ible). Figure 5 further shows that in Den-
mark the new gender vote gap emerged 
already in the 1980s, while in Italy we are 
still observing a weak old gender vote gap. 
For West Germany, the old gender vote 
gap virtually disappeared in the 1990s be-
fore it reappeared in 2010. We speculate 
that this is a “Chancellor effect”. Given 
that Christian Democrat Angela Merkel is 
the first female Chancellor, it is likely that 
she is able to attract a large share of the 
female vote. 
In a next step, we estimate logistic 
regressions of left self-placement on the 
dummy variables for gender, religiosity, 
labor market participation, marital status, 
and control variables (see Tables A2 to 
A5 in the Appendix). As in the case of the 
World Value Survey data, interaction ef-
fects in non-linear regression models are 
best analyzed using predicted probabili-
ties. Table 2a displays the effect of religi-
osity, Table 2b the effect of labor market 
participation, Table 2c the effect of marital 
status (divorced, separated, without part-
ner), and Table 2d displays the effect of 
gender on left self-placement. 
The findings presented in Tables 2a 
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to 2d (p. 27-31) can be summarized as 
follows: First, religiosity has a negative 
and substantially important effect on left 
self-placement in Italy and West Germany 
(see Table 2a). The effect of religiosity 
is weaker in Denmark and Great Britain. 
The weak effect of religiosity on left self-
placement in Great Britain is consistent 
with the absence of a strong confessional 
cleavage (see Figure 1), while the weak 
effect of religiosity in Denmark is likely 
to be the result of the low number of reli-
gious respondents (see Figure 2). 9 
Second, as Table 2b shows, labor 
market participation is a weaker predic-
tor of left self-placement than religiosity. 
Among women, labor market participa-
tion significantly increases the probability 
of left self-placement in West Germany in 
the 1980s and 2010, in Italy in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and Denmark in the 1990s. In 
contrast, labor market participation does 
not affect the probability of left self-place-
ment in Great Britain. Among men, labor 
market participation significantly increas-
es the probability of left self-placement in 
West Germany in the 1980s, in Italy in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, in Denmark in 
2010, and in Great Britain in the 1970s. 
This analogy between male and female 
voting behavior has noteworthy implica-
tions. Since labor market participation 
has similar effects on the probability of 
left self-placement for men and women, it 
cannot be ruled out that the effect of labor 
market participation on left self-place-
9 Using the original ordinal scale indicator of 
religiosity (ranging from 1 to 5) instead of the 
dummy variable leads to significant effects in 
Denmark, but not in Great Britain (results are 
available upon request).
ment is the result of the pro-labor stance 
of left and center-left parties (expected 
to affect both genders) rather than their 
programmatic focus on reconciliation of 
work and family life and their support for 
public sector jobs (expected to mostly af-
fect women). 
Third, marital status has only a weak 
effect on the probability of left self-place-
ment (see Table 2c). Among women, we 
only observe a significant positive effect 
of living alone (divorced, separated, with-
out partner) in Denmark in the 1980s, 
and a significant negative effect in West 
Germany in 2010. Among men, we ob-
serve significant positive effects in West 
Germany in the 1970s and in Italy in the 
1970s, and a significant negative effect in 
Italy in the 1980s. Overall, marital status 
has a significant positive effect on left 
self-placement in only 3 of 32 cases. In 
accordance with our theoretical expecta-
tions, marital status has no effect on the 
probability of left self-placement in Great 
Britain, which we argue took a “private” 
route to high female employment in the 
service sector. 
Finally, when controlling for religios-
ity, marital status, and labor market par-
ticipation, gender has only a weak effect 
on left self-placement (see Table 2d). Of 
the 128 logically possible combinations 
of the four countries, four decades, and 
eight combinations of the three dummy 
variables for religiosity, marital status, and 
labor market participation we are analyz-
ing, the coefficient of the variable “gen-
der” turns out to be significantly different 
from zero in only 18 cases (14.1 percent; 
in 12 cases, the coefficient is negative; in 
six cases, the coefficient is positive). In-
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terestingly, it seems as if the regression 
models for the 1970s fail to fully explain 
the old gender vote gap (seven significant 
effects of gender in the 1970s compared 
to eleven significant effects of gender in 
the other three periods combined).
We can draw two main conclusions on 
the basis of the above analysis of Euroba-
rometer data. First, the observed gender 
vote gap, both the “old” and the “new” 
one, largely disappears once control vari-
ables for religiosity, labor market partici-
pation, and marital status are introduced. 
Thus, these three factors largely explain 
the existence of the gender vote gap. Sec-
ond, among the three factors, religiosity 
has by far the largest substantive effect. 
Except in Great Britain where there is no 
confessional cleavage to speak of (see 
Figure 1) and to a certain extent Denmark 
(few religious voters), religiosity is a pow-
erful predictor of left self-placement. In 
contrast, labor market participation and 
marital status are only occasionally sig-
nificant predictors of left self-placement. 
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Table 2a: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of church attendance on left self-
placement 
WEST GERMANY Women Men 
1970s -0.022 [-0.045; 0.000] 
-0.081 
[-0.109; -0.053] 
1980s -0.063 [-0.093; -0.033]
-0.071 
[-0.109; -0.032] 
1990s -0.049 [-0.073; -0.025] 
-0.056 
[-0.086; -0.027] 
2010 0.062 [-0.459; 0.584] 
-0.180 
[-0.368; 0.008] 
ITALY Women Men 
1970s -0.283 [-0.322; -0.243] 
-0.263 
[-0.303; -0.222] 
1980s -0.215 [-0.251; -0.179] 
-0.270 
[-0.306; -0.233] 
1990s -0.148 [-0.179; -0.117] 
-0.192 
[-0.225; -0.158] 
2010 -0.200 [-0.303; -0.096] 
-0.159 
[-0.437; 0.120] 
DENMARK Women Men 
1970s -0.026 [-0.088; 0.037] 
-0.060 
[-0.078; 0.066] 
1980s -0.023 [-0.072; 0.027] 
-0.010 
[-0.072; 0.053] 
1990s -0.028 [-0.076; 0.021] 
-0.060 
[-0.103; -0.017] 
2010 -0.163 [-0.205; -0.121] 
-0.169 
[-0.252; -0.085] 
GREAT BRITAIN Women Men 
1970s -0.017 [-0.051; 0.018] 
-0.005 
[-0.044; 0.034] 
1980s 0.007 [-0.028; 0.043] 
-0.030 
[-0.072; 0.011] 
1990s -0.004 [-0.032; 0.023] 
-0.020 
[-0.054; 0.015] 
2010 -0.159 [-0.256; -0.062] 
-0.119 
[-0.208; -0.029] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010).  
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Table 2b: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of dependent employment on left 
self-placement 
WEST GERMANY Women Men 
1970s 0.019 [-0.007; 0.045] 
0.006 
[-0.023; 0.035] 
1980s 0.037 [0.006; 0.068] 
0.039 
[0.006; 0.072] 
1990s 0.002 [-0.022; 0.025] 
0.008 
[-0.026; 0.027] 
2010 0.062 [0.002; 0.121] 
-0.043 
[-0.118; 0.031] 
ITALY Women Men 
1970s 0.029 [-0.024; 0.083] 
0.100 
[0.058; 0.142] 
1980s 0.057 [0.010; 0.105] 
0.081 
[0.041; 0.121] 
1990s 0.086 [0.047; 0.125] 
0.043 
[0.009; 0.078] 
2010 -0.003 [-0.089; 0.083] 
-0.040 
[-0.123; 0.044] 
DENMARK Women Men 
1970s 0.008 [-0.017; 0.034] 
0.029 
[-0.000; 0.059] 
1980s 0.020 [-0.007; 0.047] 
0.020 
[-0.010; 0.050] 
1990s 0.036 [0.010; 0.061] 
0.017 
[-0.007; 0.040] 
2010 0.049 [-0.011; 0.109] 
0.069 
[0.001; 0.137] 
GREAT BRITAIN Women Men 
1970s 0.015 [-0.016; 0.047] 
0.043 
[0.008; 0.078] 
1980s 0.007 [-0.023; 0.037] 
0.022 
[-0.017; 0.060] 
1990s -0.006 [-0.031; 0.020] 
-0.005 
[-0.036; 0.026] 
2010 0.019 [-0.067; 0.105] 
0.017 
[-0.053; 0.086] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010).  
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Table 2c: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of marital status (divorced, 
separated, single) on left self-placement 
WEST GERMANY Women Men 
1970s 0.009 [-0.020; 0.009] 
0.060 
[0.016; 0.104] 
1980s 0.024 [-0.012; 0.060] 
0.031 
[-0.007; 0.068] 
1990s 0.015 [-0.013; 0.043] 
-0.016 
[-0.042; 0.010] 
2010 -0.048 [-0.090; -0.006] 
0.005 
[-0.085; 0.096] 
ITALY Women Men 
1970s 0.024 [-0.033; 0.080] 
0.081 
[0.027; 0.135] 
1980s -0.031 [-0.076; 0.014] 
-0.068 
[-0.112; -0.025] 
1990s 0.016 [-0.023; 0.055] 
-0.030 
[-0.070; 0.011] 
2010 -0.012 [-0.106; 0.082] 
-0.073 
[-0.164; 0.018] 
DENMARK Women Men 
1970s 0.036 [-0.007; 0.079] 
-0.004 
[-0.037; 0.028] 
1980s 0.060 [0.021; 0.099] 
-0.026 
[-0.055; 0.004] 
1990s 0.027 [-0.003; 0.058] 
0.027 
[-0.003; 0.058] 
2010 0.131 [0.048; 0.214] 
-0.067 
[-0.121; -0.013] 
GREAT BRITAIN Women Men 
1970s -0.014 [-0.057; 0.029] 
0.004 
[-0.044; 0.037] 
1980s 0.003 [-0.034; 0.040] 
0.020 
[-0.025; 0.065] 
1990s -0.006 [-0.035; 0.023] 
-0.004 
[-0.039; 0.031] 
2010 -0.051 [-0.131; 0.028] 
0.034 
[-0.048; 0.115] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010).  
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Table 2d: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of gender on left self-placement 
WEST GERMANY 1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
Not employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
-0.043 
[-0.074; -0.012] 
-0.023 
[-0.057; 0.010] 
-0.019 
[-0.047; 0.009] 
-0.116 
[-0.185; -0.048] 
Not employed, not living 
alone, religious 
0.010 
[-0.015; 0.035] 
-0.016 
[-0.053; 0.020] 
-0.012 
[-0.045; 0.022] 
0.126 
[-0.414; 0.667] 
Not employed, living 
alone, not religious 
-0.098 
[-0.158; -0.039] 
-0.030 
[-0.083; 0.023] 
0.015 
[-0.026; 0.056] 
-0.167 
[-0.261; -0.074] 
Not employed, living, 
alone, religious 
-0.008 
[-0.051; 0.036] 
-0.021 
[-0.072; 0.029] 
0.011 
[-0.030; 0.051] 
0.056 
[-0.927; 0.440] 
Employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
-0.028 
[-0.062; 0.007] 
-0.026 
[-0.064; 0.013] 
-0.018 
[-0.045; 0.009] 
-0.005 
[-0.079; 0.068] 
Employed, not living 
alone, religious 
0.023 
[-0.010; 0.056] 
-0.019 
[-0.067; 0.029] 
-0.011 
[-0.047; 0.025] 
0.229 
[-0.496; 0.954] 
Employed, living alone, 
not religious 
-0.083 
[-0.144; -0.023] 
-0.033 
[-0.084; 0.018] 
0.016 
[-0.017; 0.048] 
-0.080 
[-0.166; 0.006] 
Employed, living alone, 
religious 
0.071 
[0.035; 0.107] 
-0.025 
[-0.087; 0.037] 
0.012 
[-0.028; 0.051] 
0.130 
[-0.404; 0.663] 
ITALY 1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
Not employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
0.014 
[-0.037; 0.064] 
-0.056 
[-0.105; 0.008] 
-0.068 
[-0.110; -0.026] 
-0.043 
[-0.412; 0.056] 
Not employed, not living 
alone, religious 
-0.005 
[-0.043; 0.033] 
-0.002 
[-0.035; 0.031] 
-0.025 
[-0.055; 0.005] 
-0.090 
[-0.3729; 0.193] 
Not employed, living 
alone, not religious 
-0.049 
[-0.132; 0.034] 
-0.013 
[-0.082; 0.056] 
-0.016 
[-0.079; 0.048] 
0.023 
[-0.119; 0.165] 
Not employed, living, 
alone, religious 
-0.040 
[-0.098; 0.017] 
0.014 
[-0.022; 0.051] 
0.004 
[-0.037; 0.045] 
-0.054 
[-0.268; 0.161] 
Employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
-0.065 
[-0.133; 0.004] 
-0.079 
[-0.146; -0.012] 
-0.014 
[-0.069; 0.040] 
-0.003 
[-0.102; 0.095] 
Employed, not living 
alone, religious 
-0.051 
[-0.104; 0.003] 
-0.013 
[-0.064; 0.037] 
0.008 
[-0.037; 0.052] 
-0.069 
[-0.315; 0.177] 
Employed, living alone, 
not religious 
-0.129 
[-0.210; -0.049] 
-0.032 
[-0.109; 0.044] 
0.044 
[-0.024; 0.111] 
0.054 
[-0.064; 0.172] 
Employed, living alone, 
religious 
-0.100 
[-0.170; -0.031] 
0.010 
[-0.038; 0.059] 
0.044 
[-0.008; 0.097] 
-0.039 
[-0.224; 0.146] 
DENMARK 1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
Not employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
-0.008 
[-0.036; 0.020] 
-0.005 
[-0.034; 0.024] 
0.016 
[-0.008; 0.040] 
-0.012 
[-0.074; 0.050] 
Not employed, not living 
alone, religious 
-0.025 
[-0.107; 0.057] 
-0.016 
[-0.079; 0.046] 
0.043 
[-0.011; 0.097] 
-0.006 
[-0.062; 0.049] 
Not employed, living 
alone, not religious 
0.029 
[-0.021; 0.079] 
0.073 
[0.025; 0.120] 
0.016 
[-0.023; 0.055] 
0.166 
[0.070; 0.262] 
Not employed, living, 
alone, religious 
0.002 
[-0.100; 0.104] 
0.048 
[-0.029; 0.125] 
0.051 
[-0.017; 0.119] 
-0.004 
[-0.035; 0.028] 
Employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
-0.029 
[-0.055; -0.003] 
-0.005 
[-0.030; 0.019] 
0.035 
[0.013; 0.057] 
-0.032 
[-0.104; 0.040] 
Employed, not living 
alone, religious 
-0.047 
[-0.150; 0.056] 
-0.019 
[-0.096; 0.058] 
0.064 
[-0.004; 0.131] 
-0.010 
[-0.100; 0.079] 
Employed, living alone, 
not religious 
0.013 
[-0.040; 0.066] 
0.087 
[0.040; 0.135] 
0.037 
[-0.005; 0.079] 
0.198 
[0.094; 0.302] 
Employed, living alone, 
religious 
-0.016 
[-0.140; 0.108] 
0.058 
[-0.037; 0.153] 
0.075 
[-0.009; 0.159] 
-0.006 
[-0.056; 0.045] 
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GREAT BRITAIN 1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
Not employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
0.012 
[-0.021; 0.045] 
-0.026 
[-0.060; 0.008] 
-0.017 
[-0.045; 0.012] 
0.041 
[-0.039; 0.121] 
Not employed, not living 
alone, religious 
0.002 
[-0.044; 0.048] 
0.009 
[-0.039; 0.058] 
-0.001 
[-0.044; 0.042] 
0.002 
[-0.092; 0.096] 
Not employed, living 
alone, not religious 
0.003 
[-0.051; 0.056] 
-0.043 
[-0.099; 0.013] 
-0.018 
[-0.063; 0.027] 
-0.044 
[-0.152; 0.064] 
Not employed, living, 
alone, religious 
-0.006 
[-0.063; 0.051] 
-0.003 
[-0.071; 0.064] 
-0.003 
[-0.056; 0.050] 
-0.008 
[-0.105; 0.090] 
Employed, not living 
alone, not religious 
-0.017 
[-0.054; 0.021] 
-0.040 
[-0.078; -0.003] 
-0.017 
[-0.047; 0.013] 
0.043 
[-0.045; 0.131] 
Employed, not living 
alone, religious 
-0.027 
[-0.087; 0.034] 
-0.000 
[-0.057; 0.057] 
-0.002 
[-0.046; 0.042] 
0.002 
[-0.106; 0.110] 
Employed, living alone, 
not religious 
-0.026 
[-0.091; 0.039] 
-0.060 
[-0.118; -0.001] 
-0.019 
[-0.061; 0.024] 
-0.051 
[-0.169; 0.068] 
Employed, living alone, 
religious 
-0.035 
[-0.109; 0.040] 
-0.015 
[-0.089; 0.059] 
-0.004 
[-0.055; 0.048] 
-0.009 
[-0.122; 0.105] 
Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010).  
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Conclusions
In the preceding analyses we found re-
ligiosity to be a powerful independent 
predictor of the political preferences and 
vote choice, in particular in countries 
characterized by a strong confessional 
cleavage. Religiosity proved to be a very 
strong, in fact a much stronger predic-
tor than any of the other socio-economic 
variables we tested and it is not at all ab-
sorbed by these other variables. We also 
found the old (new) gender vote gap to be 
much weaker (stronger) once we control 
for religiosity. In fact, controlling for em-
ployment and marital status plus religios-
ity made gender differences in political 
preferences largely disappear. Our most 
important finding therefore is that the im-
pact of religion on vote choice/ political 
preferences is quite independent from its 
impact on a country’s gendered political 
economy. The “political economy expla-
nations of redistributive politics” (Cusack 
et al. 2006: 366) are clearly in need of a 
party-political complement.
Our findings speak to a puzzle of the 
comparative welfare state literature: How 
was the “women-unfriendly” welfare state 
of Continental and Southern Europe elec-
torally sustainable? Why did female vot-
ers not abandon the parties defending 
these “women-unfriendly” welfare states 
and switch allegiance to parties promot-
ing more “women-friendly” policies? We 
have pointed to one possible explana-
tion: religious voting. But in contrast to 
the previous literature we do not claim 
(but we also do not dispute) that the im-
pact of religion on the welfare state went 
via a traditional (Catholic) value system, 
which assigned the role of house-keeping 
and child-rearing to women and hindered 
their full labor market integration. 
Instead, we have highlighted the im-
portance of political cleavage lines, as 
they have become manifest in European 
party systems. In countries with a strong 
confessional (pro-clerical/anti-clerical) 
cleavage line, we argue, inter-party com-
petition over the religious voters was 
distorted, since religious voters simply 
could not vote for parties that took an 
often aggressive anti-clerical stance. A 
very traditional gender division of labor 
might be the consequence of the strong 
role that the parties of religious defense 
have played in the countries with such a 
political cleavage line. Taking the (over-
proportionately female) religious vote for 
granted, Christian democratic parties did 
not have to worry about “women-friendly” 
welfare policies. Only when the confes-
sional cleavage started to lose its saliency 
and the share of religious voters started to 
decline did Christian democratic parties 
have to adapt their political program to 
accommodate the socio-economic prefer-
ences of female voters.
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Appendix
Table A1: Left vote, logistic regression (World Value Survey aggregated file, waves 1, 2 and 4) 
  Early 1980s Early 1990s Early 2000s 
     
Gender (woman = 1) -0.264** 0.176*** 0.121* 
  (0.023) (0.009) (0.095) 
Dependent employment -0.082 0.077 -0.024 
  (0.436) (0.241) (0.742) 
Gender x dependent employment 0.320** -0.067 0.142* 
  (0.014) (0.395) (0.099) 
Church attendance -0.479*** -0.890*** -0.651*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender x church attendance 0.226* -0.036 -0.131 
  (0.096) (0.692) (0.221) 
Marital status (single, divorced, separated = 1) 0.099 0.037 0.141** 
 (0.351) (0.574) (0.044) 
Gender x marital status 0.144 -0.039 0.041 
  (0.302) (0.661) (0.652) 
Age (15-24) -0.216** 0.039 -0.050 
  (0.037) (0.592) (0.551) 
Age (35-44) -0.093 -0.050 0.008 
  (0.387) (0.389) (0.905) 
Age (45-54) -0.183 -0.329*** 0.110 
  (0.108) (0.000) (0.127) 
Age (55-64) -0.205* -0.399*** -0.032 
  (0.080) (0.000) (0.698) 
Age (65+) -0.138 -0.545*** -0.165* 
  (0.269) (0.000) (0.056) 
Low education 0.230** 0.119** 0.130** 
  (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) 
High education -0.098 0.038 0.169*** 
  (0.197) (0.466) (0.002) 
Income -0.089*** -0.099*** -0.044*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union membership 0.826*** 0.571*** 0.398*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployed 0.126 0.287*** 0.020 
  (0.399) (0.004) (0.825) 
Constant 0.587*** 0.862*** 0.439*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.085 0.063 
Observations 4’749 12’685 10’382 
Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
country fixed effects omitted from table.  
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Table A2: Determinants of left self-placement: West Germany (Eurobarometer) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
          
Gender (woman = 1) -0.538*** -0.203 -0.155 -0.868*** 
  (0.004) (0.165) (0.174) (0.005) 
Church attendance -1.171*** -0.614*** -0.526*** -0.365 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.471) 
Gender x church attendance 0.795** -0.034 0.013 0.471 
  (0.017) (0.898) (0.951) (0.488) 
Dependent employment 0.060 0.300** 0.006 -0.283 
  (0.715) (0.026) (0.956) (0.339) 
Gender x dependent employment 0.236 0.022 0.008 0.831** 
  (0.333) (0.901) (0.958) (0.038) 
Marital status (single, divorced, separated) 0.540*** 0.225* -0.143 0.030 
 (0.003) (0.095) (0.226) (0.922) 
Gender x marital status -0.397 -0.022 0.275* -0.624 
  (0.163) (0.908) (0.083) (0.175) 
Age -0.012 -0.046 -0.138*** -0.185** 
  (0.777) (0.159) (0.000) (0.018) 
Income (socio-economic level) -0.007 -0.044*** -0.029** -0.270*** 
  (0.722) (0.003) (0.013) (0.001) 
Education 0.005 0.015 -0.000 0.084*** 
  (0.368) (0.223) (0.927) (0.000) 
Constant -2.018*** -1.342*** -0.984*** -0.541 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.423) 
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.023 0.015 0.058 
Observations 4011 4638 7613 816 
Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 (2010). 
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Table A3: Determinants of left self-placement: Italy (Eurobarometer) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
          
Gender (woman = 1) 0.058 -0.244** -0.326*** -0.219 
  (0.596) (0.024) (0.002) (0.473) 
Church attendance -1.365*** -1.484*** -1.032*** -0.218 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.506) 
Gender x church attendance -0.102 0.225 0.113 -0.246 
  (0.558) (0.175) (0.420) (0.587) 
Dependent employment 0.460*** 0.388*** 0.225** -0.219 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.431) 
Gender x dependent employment -0.320** -0.076 0.265** 0.201 
  (0.043) (0.623) (0.048) (0.607) 
Marital status (single, divorced, separated) 0.367*** -0.355*** -0.158 -0.424 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.158) (0.219) 
Gender x marital status -0.257 0.182 0.250 0.353 
  (0.134) (0.284) (0.105) (0.465) 
Age -0.058** -0.001 0.043* -0.157** 
  (0.035) (0.963) (0.081) (0.039) 
Income (socio-economic level) -0.057*** -0.050*** -0.036*** -0.155** 
  (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) 
Education -0.032** -0.005 -0.014 0.018 
  (0.021) (0.715) (0.200) (0.419) 
Constant 0.068 -0.125 -0.605*** 0.305 
  (0.718) (0.463) (0.000) (0.652) 
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.075 0.045 0.020 
Observations 4063 4478 5637 633 
Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: 
Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 (2010). 
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Table A4: Determinants of left self-placement: Denmark (Eurobarometer) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
          
Gender (woman = 1) -0.119 -0.065 0.172 -0.097 
  (0.567) (0.727) (0.203) (0.756) 
Church attendance -0.075 -0.114 -0.824* -0.655 
  (0.875) (0.764) (0.052) (0.537) 
Gender x church attendance -0.336 -0.180 0.557 -1.165 
  (0.661) (0.707) (0.264) (0.433) 
Dependent employment 0.349* 0.222 0.176 0.485* 
  (0.061) (0.207) (0.173) (0.095) 
Gender x dependent employment -0.228 0.008 0.139 -0.102 
  (0.357) (0.969) (0.373) (0.787) 
Marital status (single, divorced, separated) -0.057 -0.326 0.261* -0.585* 
 (0.790) (0.113) (0.064) (0.059) 
Gender x marital status 0.481 0.890*** -0.030 1.367*** 
  (0.109) (0.000) (0.864) (0.001) 
Age -0.311*** -0.250*** -0.129*** -0.060 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.427) 
Income (socio-economic level) -0.036 -0.031 -0.025* -0.028 
  (0.231) (0.152) (0.077) (0.681) 
Education 0.009 0.055*** 0.001 0.007 
  (0.485) (0.003) (0.714) (0.562) 
Constant -1.117*** -1.479*** -1.597*** -1.489** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.042 0.017 0.036 
Observations 3518 3888 6933 872 
Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: 
Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 (2010). 
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Table A5: Determinants of left self-placement: Great Britain (Eurobarometer) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2010 
          
Gender (woman = 1) 0.161 -0.269 -0.155 0.326 
  (0.492) (0.124) (0.251) (0.403) 
Church attendance -0.060 -0.299 -0.191 -0.481 
  (0.816) (0.178) (0.281) (0.453) 
Gender x church attendance -0.133 0.375 0.146 -0.039 
  (0.692) (0.192) (0.523) (0.964) 
Dependent employment 0.513** 0.187 -0.047 0.152 
  (0.027) (0.277) (0.745) (0.691) 
Gender x dependent employment -0.329 -0.108 -0.011 -0.014 
  (0.247) (0.633) (0.953) (0.978) 
Marital status (single, divorced, separated) -0.047 0.168 -0.039 0.274 
 (0.861) (0.367) (0.814) (0.480) 
Gender x marital status -0.121 -0.139 -0.022 -0.700 
  (0.747) (0.603) (0.920) (0.223) 
Age -0.086* -0.106*** -0.152*** -0.048 
  (0.072) (0.008) (0.000) (0.589) 
Income (socio-economic level) -0.151*** -0.107*** -0.083*** -0.115 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.153) 
Education -0.012 0.013 -0.001 0.066** 
  (0.493) (0.652) (0.966) (0.022) 
Constant -1.130*** -0.873*** -0.648*** -2.235** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.018 0.014 0.032 
Observations 2799 3288 4952 534 
Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 (2010). 
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Data description: 
In this analysis we have used the following 
data sets: 
World Value survey four-wave integrated 
data file 
The file can be downloaded from the fol-
lowing website: http://www.wvsevsdb.
com/ 
Bibliographic citation: European and 
World Values Surveys four-wave integrat-
ed data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. 
Surveys designed and executed by the 
European Values Study Group and World 
Values Survey Association. File Producers: 
ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain and Tilburg Uni-
versity, Tilburg, the Netherlands. File Dis-
tributors: ASEP/JDS and GESIS, Cologne, 
Germany.
We use data from wave 1 (early 1980s), 
wave 2 (early 1990s), and wave 3 (early 
2000s) for the following ten countries: Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germa-
ny, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and 
the United States of America.
Operationalization: 
Left vote (variable e179): If there were a 
national election tomorrow, for which 
party on this list would you vote? The 
dummy variable has been created by 
distinguishing between respondents 
with the intention to vote for center-left 
and left parties and respondents with 
the intention to vote for any other party. 
Parties have been classified using the 
party classification scheme by Cusack 
et al. (2006). 
Gender (x001): Respondents answering 
female have been coded as one. 
Church attendance (f028): How often 
do you attend religious services? The 
dummy variable has been created by 
distinguishing between respondents 
attending religious service once a week 
or more often and respondents attend-
ing religious less than once a week. 
Labor market participation (x028): Are you 
employed now or not? Respondents are 
coded as economically active if they are 
employed (full-time or part-time), self-
employed or unemployed. 
Divorced, separated, or without partner 
(x007): Are you currently … (3) divorced, 
(4) separated, or (6) single/never mar-
ried? This dummy variable distin-
guishes between respondents who are 
divorced, separated, or without partner 
and the remaining respondents (exclud-
ing the missing observations). 
Age (x003): The age of the respondent at 
the time of the survey. Respondents 
below the age of 18 have been excluded 
from the survey. We incorporate age 
in the form of dummy variables into 
the regression model. The six dummy 
variables capture respondents aged 18 
to 24, aged 25 to 34, aged 35 to 44, aged 
45 to 54, aged 55 to 64, and aged 65 or 
older (variable x003r). We use the group 
aged 25 to 34 as reference category. 
Education (x025): The variables ‘low edu-
cation’ and ‘high education’ (reference 
category ‘middle education’) have been 
coded using the following survey ques-
tion: What is the highest educational 
level that you have attained? We use the 
recoded education variable provided by 
the survey (x025r), which distinguishes 
between ‘low education’, ‘middle 
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education’, and ‘high education’. We 
use ‘middle education’ as reference 
category. 
Income (x047): The income variable is 
provided by the survey and distinguish-
es between ten steps. 
Union membership (a067): Please look 
carefully at the following list of volun-
tary organizations and activities and 
say, which, if any, do you belong to? 
Labour unions. 
Unemployed (x028): This dummy variable 
distinguishes between unemployed re-
spondents and the remaining respond-
ents (excluding missing observations). 
the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend File 
1970-2002. Data set Edition 2.00. 2003: Eu-
robarometer 59.1; 2004: Eurobarometer 61; 
2005: Eurobarometer 63.1, Eurobarometer 
63.4, Eurobarometer 64.3; 2006: Euroba-
rometer 65.1, Eurobarometer 65.2; 2007: 
Eurobarometer 67.2; 2008: Eurobarometer 
69.2; 2009: Eurobarometer 71.1; 2010: Eu-
robarometer 73.1, Eurobarometer 73.4. 
All these files can be downloaded from the 
following website: http://www.gesis.org 
EB63.1, EB63.4, EB64.3, and EB65.2 con-
tain a variable capturing church attend-
ance, but no variable capturing income or 
the socio-economic status. Therefore, for 
the multivariate analysis only the Trend 
File and EB73.1 have been used (in the lat-
ter case using socio-economic status as a 
proxy for income). 
We use data for the following seven coun-
tries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Great 
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and West 
Germany,
Operationalization Eurobarometer Trend 
File: 
Left self-placement (variable lrs): In 
political matters people talk of ‘the left’ 
and ‘the right’. How would you place 
your views on this scale? The variable 
runs from 1 to 10. We have recoded this 
variable into a dummy variable captur-
ing whether the respondent has placed 
him- or herself in the interval 1 to 3 
(left) or not. 
Gender (sex): Respondents answering 
female have been coded as one.
Church attendance (churchat): Do you got 
to religious services several times a 
week, once a week, a few times in the 
year or never? The dummy variable has 
been created by distinguishing between 
respondents attending religious service 
once a week or more often and re-
spondents attending religious less than 
once a week. 
Labor market participation (occup): What 
is your occupation? This dummy vari-
able captures whether the respondent 
is in dependent employment (1) or not 
(0) (excluding missing observations). 
Divorced, separated, or without partner 
(married): Are you single, married, liv-
ing as married, divorced, separated or 
widowed? This dummy variable distin-
guishes between respondents who are 
single, divorced, or separated and the 
remaining respondents (excluding the 
missing observations).
Age (age): Could you tell me your date of 
birth please? We have subsequently 
recoded this variable into six catego-
ries: respondents younger than 25, 
respondents aged 25 to 34, respondents 
aged 35 to 44, respondents aged 45 
to 54, respondents aged 55 to 64, and 
respondents aged 65 or older. 
Income (income): This variable is pro-
vided by the survey and distinguishes 
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between 13 categories. High values 
indicate high earnings. 
Education (educ): How old were you when 
you finished your full-time education? 
Respondents still studying have been 
dropped from the data set. 
Operationalization EB73.1: 
Left self-placement (variable D1): In 
political matters people talk of ‘the left’ 
and ‘the right’. How would you place 
your views on this scale? The variable 
runs from 1 to 10. We have recoded this 
variable into a dummy variable captur-
ing whether the respondent has placed 
him- or herself in the interval 1 to 3 
(left) or not. 
Gender (D10): Respondents answering 
female have been coded as one.
Church attendance (QB34): Apart from 
weddings or funerals, about how often 
do you attend religious services? This 
variable distinguishes between eight 
different levels of religiosity. The 
dummy variable for church attendance 
has been created by distinguishing be-
tween respondents attending religious 
service once a week or more often and 
respondents attending religious less 
than once a week.
Labor market participation (D15AR): 
What is your occupation? This dummy 
variable captures whether the respond-
ent is in dependent employment (1) 
or not (0) (excluding missing observa-
tions). 
Divorced, separated, or without partner 
(D7B): Could you give me the letter 
which corresponds best to your current 
situation? This dummy variable distin-
guishes between respondents who are 
divorced, separated, or single and the 
remaining respondents (excluding the 
missing observations).
Age (D11R2): How old are you? We have 
subsequently recoded this variable into 
six categories: respondents younger 
than 25, respondents aged 25 to 34, 
respondents aged 35 to 44, respondents 
aged 45 to 54, respondents aged 55 to 
64, and respondents aged 65 or older. 
Socio-economic level (D61): On the fol-
lowing scale, step ‘1’ corresponds to 
‘the lowest level in the society’, step 
‘10’ corresponds to ‘the highest level 
in the society’. Could you tell me on 
which step you would place yourself? 
EB73.1 (2010) does not contain a vari-
able ‘income’. However, an analysis of 
Eurobarometer Trend File data shows 
that income is a very powerful predictor 
of socio-economic level. We therefore 
use this variable as proxy variable for 
income. 
Education (VD8): How old were you when 
you stopped your full-time education? 
Respondents still studying have been 
dropped from the data set.
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trum für Sozialpolitik, Universität Bremen.
Starting with a comparative assessment of 
different welfare regimes and political econ-
omies from the perspective of gender aware-
ness and “pro-women” policies, this paper 
identifies the determinants of cross-national 
variation in women’s chances of being in 
a high-status occupation in twelve West Euro- pean countries. Special emphasis is given to 
size and structure of the service sector, including share of women in public employment and 
structural factors such astrade union density and employment protection. The first level of 
comparison between men and women concentrates on gender representation in the higher 
echelons of the job hierarchy, while in the second section we extend the scope of analysis, 
comparing women in high-status occupations and low-wage employment in order to allow for 
a more nuanced study of gender and class interaction. The first analysis is based on European 
Social Survey data for the years 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008, capturing recent trends in occupa-
tional dynamics. Results indicate that in general a large service sector and a high trade union 
density enhance women’s chances of being in a high-status occupations while more specifi-
cally a large public sector helps to reduce channeling women in low-wage employment. Thus, 
equality at the top can well be paired with inequality at the bottom, as postindustrial countries 
with a highly polarized occupational hierarchy such as the UK show.
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